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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR MARYLAND 
LAWYERS: INDIVIDUAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
Charles A. Reest 
'TAllthough in the past it might have been safe for counsel to 
raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly 
it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state 
constitutional questions. ''1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This guide to selected aspects of Maryland state constitutional 
law is designed for use by lawyers and law students who are familiar 
with the principles of federal constitutional law. After stating the 
justifications for studying the state constitution, this article 
compares provisions regarding individual rights of a civil nature in 
the Constitution of Maryland with related provisions in the 
Constitutimn of the United States. 
This study does not compare state and federal constitutional 
rights of a criminal nature,2 and does not consider the constitutional 
and policy limitations on judicial relief for violations of individual 
rights.3 
II. WHY STUDY THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
As shall be demonstrated, the Constitution of Maryland and the 
Constitution of the United States have been construed similarly with 
respect to many individual rights.4 Nonetheless, the study of the 
state constitution is useful for several reasons. 5 
First, according to the theory of our system of federalism, state 
law is the primary source of protection for the fundamental 
t J.D., 1970, Harvard University; Member of Maryland Bar, 1970; Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. 
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
2. For a discussion of state and federal constitutional rights of a criminal nature, 
see Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 
(1976); Wilkes, More On the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 
875 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 
(1974); Comment, Expanding Criminal Procedural Rights Under State Constitu-
tions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909 (1976). 
3. Examples of such constitutional and policy limitations include the case-or· 
controversy doctrine, the requirement of standing, the requirement of justiciabil· 
ity, the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity, the abstention doctrine, the 
requirement of exhaustion of remedies, and the principle of stare decisis. 
4. See discussion at Part III infra. See also Report of the Constitutional Convention 
Commission 98 (1967). 
5. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. 
REV. 454 (1970); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of 
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Project Report: Toward An Activist 
Role for State Bills of Ri/!hts, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973). . 
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privileges and immunities of citizens.6 This theory was a reality for 
most of our country's existence. The Maryland Constitution of 1776, 
the predecessor to the Maryland Constitutions of 1851, 1864 and 
1867,7 preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the United States 
in 1788 and the federal Bill of Rights in 1791.8 Initially, the United 
States Supreme Court held that provisions of the Bill of Rights by 
their own terms applied only against federal, not state, governmen-
tal action,9 and even after adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 
1868, the first provisions of the Bill of Rights were not incorporated 
through the due process clause as against state governmental action 
until 1925.10 
Second, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights, applying as 
against federal governmental action, have never been incorporated 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to 
apply as against state action. These unincorporated provisions are 
the second amendment right to keep and bear arms,l1 the fifth 
amendment right to indictment by grand jury,12 and the seventh 
amendment right to jury trial in civil cases.13 
The incorporation of certain other rights as against state action 
is in doubt, and the only guarantee of such rights may be by state 
law. The third amendment right not to have soldiers quartered in 
one's home, the eighth amendment right to reasonable bail,14 and 
the eighth amendment right to fines which are reasonable in 
amountI5 are examples of rights which may not apply to the states, 
absent a comparable state constitutional provision. 
6. Slaughter·House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. 
Madison); Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission 98 (1967). See 
also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973). 
7. At least one provision of the MARYLAND CONST. OF 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS, 
article 16, the prohibition of bills of attainder, apparently served as a model for 
its counterpart in the federal constitution. See B. SCHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 279 (1971). 
8. See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1-352 (1915). 
9. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
10. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), assumed that the first amendment 
freedoms of speech and press were among the fundamental "liberties" protected 
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from impairment by the 
states. 
11. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Burton v.Bills, N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 
521 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812.(1969). 
12. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 
(1884). 
13. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 
(1874). 
14. See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959) (question obliquely raised, but not 
decided); cf. United States ex reI. Rainwater v. Morris, 411 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ill. 
1976) (excessive bail prohibition applies to the states). 
15. Ct. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment prohibits imprisonment of indigents for failure to pay 
fines arising from convictions for traffic offenses, where no imprisonment is 
imposed on those who pay the fines). 
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Third, the state constitution protects certain rights which are 
not guaranteed by the federal constitution.16 The state constitution 
also protects certain other rights more completely than does the 
federal constitution.17 In addition, the various state statutes,18 court 
rules,l'g and principles of common law20 that implement the state 
constitutional provisions may offer greater protection than does 
federal law. 
Fourth, certain rights, such as "liberty" Iilnd "property," that are 
within the procedural protections of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, may be defined with reference to state law.21 
Fifth, where rights are guaranteed by both state and federal 
constitutions, the state ground may be judicially preferred as the 
ground of decision.22 When a state court judgment rests on both 
federal and state law, the Supreme Court will not grant review,23 
because the judgment rests on "adequate and independent state 
grounds."24 When a federal court hears a case that includes both 
federal and state constitutional issues,25 that court may abstain, in 
order to permit litigation of the state claims in state courtS.26 
Sixth, many commentators have noted that the Supreme Court 
is taking an increasingly conservative view of the nature and extent 
of the individual rights which are protected by the federal 
constitution.27 The state constitution, to the extent that it is more 
protective of individual rights than the federal constitution, may 
provide the only protection for individual rights.28 
16. See discussion at Part III infra, especially notes and accompanying text. 
17. See notes 177-86 infra and accompanying text. 
18. See notes 124-25 infra and accompanying text. See generally Force, State "Bills 
of Rights", 3 VAL. L. REV. 125, 132-4 (1969). 
19. C[. notes 126-28 infra and accompanying text (state and federal law offer similar 
protection). 
20. C[. note 28 infra. 
21. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Riger v. 
L&B Ltd. Partnership, 278 Md. 281, 363 A.2d 481 (1976). Substantive rights 
protected only by the state constitution are discussed at notes 177-86 infra and 
accompanying text. 
22. One commentator has concluded that, as a matter of logic, a state constitutional 
claim should be disposed of before reaching a similar federal constitutional 
claim. Linde, Without "Due Process," 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 133-34 (1970). 
23. Supreme Court review of state court judgments is provided for by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257 (1970). See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
24. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
25. State constitutional issues may arise in cases in federal courts based on diversity 
of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), or as ancillary or pendent to federal 
claims. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 9, 19 (3d ed. 1976). 
26. Three types of abstention are described in Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Note, that the mere existence of 
similar federal and state constitutional provisions ordinarily does not justify 
abstention. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
27. See the sources cited in note 2 supra. 
28. A state is ordinarily free as a matter of state law to protect individual rights not 
guaranteed by the federal constitution. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 
(1967). 
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III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Individual rights of a civil nature29 under the constitutions of 
Maryland and the United States are discussed below generally in the 
order in which they appear in the Constitution of the United States. 
Two collateral matters are considered separately: (1) the "state 
action" requirement, which is an element of most constitutional 
rights, and (2) remedies, without which the protections afforded by 
constitutional rights would be only theoretical. 
A. Rights 
1. Impairment of Contracts. The provision of the Constitution 
of the United States that prohibits state laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts30 has no counterpart in the Constitution of 
Maryland.31 There is, however, a somewhat similar state statute.32 
29. As stated in Part I supra, this article does not include individual rights of a 
criminal nature, including those guaranteed by U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 
(habeas corpus); art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1 (bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws); art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (criminal trial by jury); art. III, § 3 (treason); amend. IV 
(searches and seizures); amend. V (grand jury, double jeopardy and self-
incrimination); amend. VI (speedy and public criminal trial by jury, notice of 
charges, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process and counsel); amend. 
VIII (bail, fines and cruel and unusual punishment). 
30. U.S. CaNsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 states: "No State shall ... pass any ... Law 
impairing the obligation of Contracts." 
31. Cf, MD. CaNsT. OF 1851 art. X, § 7: "All rights vested, and all liabilities incurred 
shall remain as if this Constitution had not been adopted." 
The common law prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts. 
Watkins v. Worthington, 2 Bland. 486 (1830), held that since English courts had 
no power to impair the obligation of contracts, neither do courts of Maryland, 
especially in view of the fact that the state has adopted by constitutional 
provision the common law of England. 
Note that MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5, set forth below, expressly does 
not constitutionalize the common law: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of 
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and 
to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth 
day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and qhich, by 
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other 
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the 
Courts of Law or Equity; ... except such as may have since expired, or 
may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, 
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the 
Legislature of this State. 
Thus, the legislature may change the common law. Day v. State, 7 Gill. 321 
(1848). 
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 1 (1976) provides: 
The adoption of this Code shall not affect or impair any right, vested or 
acquired and existing at the time of its adoption, nor shall it impair, 
discharge or release any existing contract, obligation, duty or liability of 
any kind whatsoever. All pending suits, actions and prosecutions for 
crimes or misdemeanors, including all civil and criminal proceedings 
whatsoever, shall be prosecuted and proceeded with to final determina-
tion, and judgment entered therein as if this Code had not been adopted. 
Cf, MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 4 (1976): "No rights, property or privileges held under 
a charter or grant from this State shall be in any manner impaired or affected by 
the adoption of this Code." 
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While the federal constitutional provision clearly is not an absolute 
bar to state laws impairing the obligation of contracts,33 the effect of 
the state statutory provisions, which have not yet been interpreted in 
a reported judicial opinion, is unclear.34 
2. Full Faith and Credit. The federal constitutional provision 
that requires each state to give full faith and credit to the statutes 
and judicial decisions of other states35 has no counterpart in the 
state constitution. State statutes on the subject36 relate to the means 
of proving such statutes and judicial decisions, but do not deal with 
whether they should be given effect. 
3. Interstate Privileges and Immunities. The federal constitu-
tional provision that requires a state to accord citizens of other 
states all the privileges and immunities of its own citizens37 has no 
counterpart in the state constitution. 
4. Religion. The federal and state constitutions include three 
guarantees of religious liberty; each constitution prohibits the use of 
religious tests and the establishment of religion and each protects 
the free exercise of religion. The Maryland provisions that prohibit 
religious tests and the establishment of religion appear to offer less 
protection for individual rights than do the federal provisions. the 
Maryland provision regarding the free exercise of religion appears to 
offer the same protection as does the federal provision. 
(a) Religious Tests. The constitutions of the United States38 
and Maryland39 prohibit, in almost identical terms, any religious 
test as a qualification for office. The Maryland Constitution, 
33. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
34. For example, the effect of the state statutory provision on certain other statutes 
that expressly impair the obligation of contracts has not been decided. E.g., MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 78A, § 7A(b) (1975) (invalidating certain state construction 
contracts without nondiscrimination clauses); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-305 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (invalidating certain construction industry agree· 
ments indemnifying a party against injury from negligence); MD. COM. LAw 
CODE ANN. § 11-204(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (invalidating certain discriminatory 
boycott agreements). 
35. U.S. CaNsT. art. IV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit shall 
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of 
every other State." 
36. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-202 (statutes of other states), 10-501 to 
-504 (common law and statutes of other states), and 10-601 (judgments of courts 
of other states) (1974). 
37. U.S. CaNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." See 
generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 provides in pertinent part: "[N]o religious Test shall 
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States." 
39. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 37 provides: 
That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any 
officer of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in 
the existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath 
of office than the oath prescribed by this Constitution. 
See also the discussion of MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 36 at note 44 infra. 
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however, permits the use mf a test requiring a declaration of belief in 
the existence of God;40 this test has been held to violate the freedom 
of belief and religion protected by the first and fourteenth 
amendments to the federal constitution.41 A 1970 amendment to 
another provision of the Maryland Constitution, however, appar-
ently abolishes the unconstitutional test.42 
(b) Establishment. The general provision of the Constitution 
of the United States43 and the more specific provision of the 
Constitution of Maryland44 that prohibit an establishment of 
religion are substantially different.45 The Maryland Constitution's 
statement of a duty of every man to worship God and its suggestion 
of incompetence of witnesses and jurors who do not declare a belief 
in the existence of God46 have been held to violate the right to free 
40. See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-56 (1915) for a 
discussion of the religious belief requirement. 
41. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), rev'g 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960) 
(notary public); White v. State, 244 Md. 188, 223 A.2d 259 (1966) (judge, state's 
attorney, and witness); Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) 
(grand and petit juror). As to the consequence of a judicial determination that a 
state constitutional provision conflicts with the Constitution of the United 
States, see Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976). 
The Supreme Court in Torcaso expressly reserved the question of whether 
the Maryland. test oath requirement also violated Article VI, cl. 3 of the 
Constitution of the United States. 367 U.S. at 489 n.1. 
42. See the second paragraph of MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 36, set forth at 
note 44 infra. 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
44. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 36 states: 
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner 
as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to 
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any 
law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious 
persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the 
color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the 
State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their 
natural civil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to 
frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any 
place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise 
competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on account of 
his religious belief, provided, he believes in the existence of God, and 
that under His dispensation such person will be held morally accounta· 
ble for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor either in this world 
or in the world to come. 
Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to belief in, 
reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any 
governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, 
school, institution, or place. 
Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion. 
45. But see A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54-55 (1915) (concluding 
that the federal and state provisions respecting establishment religion are 
similar in nature). 
46. Cf. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 39 (prescribing the form for the declaration 
of belief): "That the manner of administering an oath or affirmation to any 
person, ought to be such as those of the religious persuasion, profession, or 
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exercise of religion protected by the first and fourteenth amendments 
to the federal constitution.47 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland arrived at the same 
conclusions under both the federal and state establishment clauses 
when considering the validity of tax exemptions for places of public 
worship 48 and when considering the validity of statutory valuation 
procedures in condemnation of church property.49 When considering 
the question of state construction grants to private colleges with 
religious affiliation, however, the court of appeals construed the 
federal and state provisions differently; grants to certain colleges 
were upheld and grants to others were struck down under the 
"purpose" and "effect" test of the first amendment, but all the grants 
were upheld under Maryland law, since the constitution had never 
been held to invalidate grants to educational institutions controlled 
by religious orders and operating at a level beyond which the state 
provided universal educational facilities for its citizens. 5O 
denomination, of which he is a member, generally esteem the most effectual 
confirmation by the attestation of the Divine Being." 
But cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 70, § 9 (1970), which provides: 
It shall only be necessary for an officer who is required to take and 
subscribe the oath prescribed by the sixth section of the first article of 
the Constitution [prescribing the form of oath for persons elected or 
appointed to state office] to declare orally at the time his belief in the 
Christian religion, or, if he profess to be a Jew, or his belief in a future 
state of rewards and punishments; and it shall be presumed that an 
officer who has taken and subscribed the oath made ut the same time 
such declaration of belief. 
The validity of the Article 39 requirement of "attestation of the Divine Being" 
has been questioned. Constitutional Revision Study Documents 33 (1968). 
47. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 
Md. 388, 190 A.2d q21 (1963) (both citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961». 
48. Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); cf. Ballard v. Supervisor of Assessments, 269 Md. 
397, 306 A.2d 506 (1973) (refusal to grant an exemption was no violation of free 
exercise clause of first amendment or article 36). 
49. Davis v. Montgomery County, 267 Md. 456, 298 A.2d 178 (1972); cf. McGowan v. 
State, 220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1959), aii'd, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding 
Sunday Blue Laws against attack under the first and fourteenth amendments to 
federal constitution, but without considering impact of the state constitution); 
Hiller v. State, 124 Md. 385, 92 A. 842 (1914) (upholding city ordinance 
prohibiting ball playing on Sunday against attack under the fourteenth 
amendment to Federal Constitution and article 36, but not considering impact of 
first amendment, which had not yet been incorporated into due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment); Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 28 A. 405 (1894) 
(upholding statute prohibiting work on Sunday against attack under the 
fourteenth amendment and article 36, but not considering impact of first 
amendment, which had not yet been incorporated into due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment). 
50. Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Public Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). A later attack on public aid to private colleges 
was rejected solely on the basis of the establishment clause of the first 
amendment. Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), 
aii'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
Examples of other traditional state regulation of religious matters include 
MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -336 (1975), pertaining to religious 
corporations, and MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, § 3A (1972), authorizing certain 
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(c) Free Exercise. The federal51 and state 52 constitutional 
provisions that protect the free exercise of religion have been given a 
similar construction by the Maryland Court of Appeals.58 As noted 
above, certain provisions of the Maryland Constitution have been 
held to violate the free exercise of religion protected by the. federal 
constitution.54 
5. Expression. 
(a) Free Speech and Press. The federal 55 and state56 constitu-
tional prOVISIOns protecting free speech and press have been 
construed in pari materia, and have substantially similar legal 
effect. 57 
religious officials to solemnize marriages. The constitutionality of the former 
provisions have been upheld against first amendment establishment and free 
exercise clauses attack. Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of God, 249 
Md. 650,241 A.2d 691 (1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969), aff'd, 
254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, 396 U.S. 367 (1970). 
51. U.S. CaNST. amend. I, in relevant part, is set forth in note 43 supra. 
52. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 36 is set forth in note 44 supra. 
53. McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147,265 A.2d 453 (1970); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 
30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d 334 (1976), cert. denied, 276 Md. 750 (1976). See 
generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 54-55 (1915). To the 
extent, however that article 36 would permit limitations on one's free exercise of 
religion where "he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or 
shall infringe the laws of morality," the state's interest may be less than the 
compelling interest required by McMillan. In Snyder, the court found a 
compelling state interest in safeguarding "the peace, health and good order of 
the community." Later passages in Snyder stated, however, that individual free 
exercise rights must be weighed against state interests, and that, in order for 
religious conduct to be regulated, it must pose a substantial threat to public 
safety, peace, or order. 
54. See cases cited in note 47 supra. In Kirkley v. State, 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 
1974), the court held that MD. CaNST. art. III, § 11, which prohibited ministers 
and preachers from holding seats in the state legislature, violated the free 
exercise clause of the first amendment. That holding was predicted in 56 Md. 
Att'y Gen. Op. 25 (1971). 
In 1948, an amendment was added to MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 38, 
which had the practical effect of prospectively nullifying the mortmain 
provision. Constitutional Revision Study Documents 32, 39 (1968). 
55. U.S. CaNST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law 
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 
56. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 40 states: "That the liberty of the press ought 
to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to 
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that privilege." 
57. Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 310 A.2d 
156 (1973); Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 197 A.2d 232 (1964), rev'd on other 
grounds, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See also A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 
613-62 (1915). 
The phrase in the Maryland provision, holding persons responsible for abuse 
of the free speech and press privilege, see note 56 supra, has no counterpart in 
the first amendment, see note 55 supra. However, the first amendment has been 
construed as leaving persons responsible for certain abuses of free speech and 
press. Thus, the first amendment offers no protection for certain types of 
expression, e.g., intentional defamation, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, 
false advertising, solicitation of crime and conspiracy. In addition, the first 
amendment permits certain incidental limitations on the time, place, and 
manner of expression, where those limitations are justified by strong governmen-
tal interests. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
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One difference between the two results from a state statute. 
Although there is no first amendment "newsmen's privilege" not to 
reveal confidential sources to a grand jury,58 there is such a state 
statutory privilege.59 Thus, the state right appears to be somewhat 
broader than the federal right. 
(b) Petition. The rights to petition the government under the 
federal60 and state61 constitutions have been construed similarly.62 
(c) Association. While the right of association is not expressly 
recognized in the federal constitution, the United States Supreme 
Court has held it to be within the scope of protection afforded by the 
first amendment.63 No right of association has been recognized 
under the Maryland Constitution. It is likely, however, that such a 
right will be implied in Article 40 of the Constitution of Maryland, 
which, as noted above, has been construed in pari materia with the 
first amendment.64 
6. Keep and Bear Arms. The federal constitutional right of the 
people to keep and bear arms65 is conditioned upon the right being 
reasonably related to a well-regulated militia.66 A state constitu-
tional provision, which has a similar effect,67 grants no such right, 
but affirms the value of a militia.68 
58. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
59. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974) provides: 
A person engaged in, connected with, or employed on a newspaper or 
journal or for any radio or television station may not be compelled to 
disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial or before any committee mf the 
legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured 
or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper or disseminated 
by the radio or television station where he is engaged, connected with, or 
employed. 
ThE;! statute, being in derogation of the common law (at which there was no 
newsmen's privilege), has received a strict construction. Lightman v. State, 15 
Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), aff'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law 
... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." 
61. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 13 states: "That every man hath a right to 
petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly 
manner." That article 13 expressly protects petition to the "Legislature,'! not the 
"government," has been observed. Report of the Constitutional Convention 
Commission 100 (1967); 60 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 430 (1975). 
62. Richards Furniture Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 196 A,2d 621 
(1964). See also A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 23 (1915). 
63. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
64. See discussion preceding note 57 supra. 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. II provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not 
be infringed." 
66. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
67. A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 50-51 (1915). 
68. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 28 provides: "Tl,at a well regulated militia is 
the proper and natural defense of a free Government." None of Maryland's 
constitutions has ever included language regarding the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms. See Debates of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 
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Since the federal constitutional provision has been held not to be 
incorporated through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to apply as against state action, only the state 
constitutional provision offers protection against state action.69 
7. Quartering of Soldiers. The federapo and state71 constitu-
tions, in almost identical terms,72 prohibit the quartering of soldiers 
in any house in peacetime without consent of the owners, and in 
wartime except as prescribed by law. 
Since the federal constitutional provision has never been 
incorporated through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to apply as against state action, the state constitutional 
provision may offer the only protection against state action. 
8. Due Process. The federal constitution includes due process 
clauses in both the fifth amendment, impliedly applicable only as 
against action of the federal government,73 and in the fourteenth 
amendment, expressly applicable as against action of the states. Due 
process is treated in part 14 infra in the context of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
9. Just Compensation. The federaP4 and state75 provisions 
requiring just compensation in the event of a governmental taking 
1867150-51 (1923), where proposed amendments to article 28 were defeated. The 
proposals would have included language regarding such a right. Opponents of 
the proposals argued that the proposals would be dangerous, that the proposals 
would be inconsistent with the criminal law presumption of evil intent on the 
part of a person going about armed, that being armed was the usage of 
barbarians, not of enlightened people, and that the proposals would prohibit 
disarming drunks. 
69. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. III provides: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered 
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law." 
71. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 31 provides: "That no soldier shall, in time of 
peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of 
war, except in the manner prescribed by Law." 
72. See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 51 (1915). 
73. C{. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (just compensation 
clause of the fifth amendment applies only as against action of the federal, not 
the state, government). 
74. U.S. CaNsT. amend. V provides in part as follows: "[N]or shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation." The due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution ofthe United States has been held 
to imply a just compensation requirement where the states exercise the power of 
eminent domain. 
75. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 40 states: "The General Assembly shall enact no Law 
authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensa· 
tion, as agreed upon between the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid 
or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation." The right of just 
compensation is also implicit in MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23, which is 
set forth in note 112 infra. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 
272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974). See MD. CaNST. art. III, §§ 40A to 400 and art. 
XI-B to XI-D for just compensation provisions relating to takings of property by 
certain subdivisions. The "public use" requirement of article III, § 40 is, 
apparently, no more restrictive of the eminent domain power than its counterpart 
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution or than the 
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have been equated.76 Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
stated that the decisions of the Supreme Court on the federal right of 
just compensation ure practically direct authorities as to the 
construction of the state right. 77 The prior payment or tender 
requirement of the state constitutional provision,78 however, is 
lacking in the fifth amendment;79 this provision requires only that 
reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensa-
tion be made before the taking. so Thus the protection afforded by the 
state constitution appears to be greater than that provided by the 
federal constitution. Statutes and court rules modify the substance of 
both the federal81 and the state82 rights in similar ways. 
10. Jury Trial in Civil Cases. The federal33 and state84 
constitutional provisions that protect the right to jury trial in civil 
cases are somewhat similar. Since the federal provision has been 
held not to be incorporated through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to apply as against state action, only the 
state constitutional provision offers protection against state action.85 
The federal and state provisions can be compared in the 
following respects: (a) the nature of the right, (b) incidents of the 
right, (c) judicial supervisory techniques, and (d) reexamination. 
limitations in the other Maryland constitutional provisions. Prince George's 
County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975). Cf. 
Ghingher & Ghingher, A Contemporary Appraisal of Condemnation in 
Maryland, 30 MD. L. REv. 301, 302-03 (1970) ("public use" in article III, § 40 
means actual use by the public, not merely a use which benefits the public). 
76. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 
(1974). 
77.Id. 
78. MD. CONST. art. III, § 40 (quoted at note 75 supra). The "quick-take" provisions of 
MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40A to 40D permit payment to the property owner or 
deposit into court of an amount the condemnor estimates is the fair value of the 
property, but such amount is subject to increase in accordance with the award of 
a jury. 
79. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890). 
80.Id. 
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970); FED. R. Crv. P. 71A. 
82. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -212 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. RULES U1 
to 27. 
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
84. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 6 provides: "The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact 
in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount 
in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably 
preserved. " 
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 5 (note 31 supra) and 23 (note 112 infra) 
provide in general terms for the right of trial by jury, and MD. CONST. art. III, 
§ 40 provides for the right of trial by jury in eminent domain proceedings. A 1970 
amendment to article XV, § 6 changed the amount in controversy from $5 to 
$500. 
85. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. 
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(a.) The Nature of the Right. Except for the difference in the 
value or amount in controversy required by the federal and state 
provisions,86 the nature of the rights of trial by jury in civil cases are 
similar in nature. Under both constitutions the rights obtain 
regarding issues of fact87 where historically there was a right to a 
jury trial, but do not obtain in equitable actions, where there was no 
such right at common law;88 the failure to make a timely demand for 
a jury trial constitutes a waiver of the right under both the federal 
and state constitutions,89 and neither provides a constitutional right 
to trial to the court without a jury. 90 
(b.) Incidents of the Right. Controversy over the incidents of 
the right to jury trial has centered on the questions of (i) whether a 
jury of twelve is required and (ii) whether there must be unanimity. 
(i.) Jury of 12? A court rule providing for a jury of six persons 
was upheld under the federal constitution,91 and the Attorney 
General of Maryland has opined that the state legislature might also 
provide for a jury of six under the state constitution.92 
(ii.) Unanimity? The question of whether jury unanimity is 
required by the federal and state constitutions in civil cases has not 
been definitely resolved.93 
86. See notes 83 and 84 supra. 
87. The right of trial by jury under the Constitution of Maryland is expressly limited 
to "issues offact." See note 84 supra; cf. MD. CONST. art. XV, § 5 (jury is the judge 
of law, as well as fact, in criminal cases). The right of trial by jury under the 
Constitution of the United States is not expressly limited to issues of fact, except 
by reference to the Reexamination Clause. See note 83 supra. However, the right, 
even without reference to that clause, has been construed to be limited to issues 
of fact. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Sioux City 
& P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874). 
88. The federal and state rights are compared in Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 
A.2d 670 (1975); appl. for stay of execution denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). 
Interpretation of the federal right has, of course, advanced beyond a mere 
historical test. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (the right 
to jury trial of a legal issue is not lost because the issue exists in a case that is 
essentially equitable in nature). 
89. The federal and state rights are compared in Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 
A.2d 670 (1975). 
90. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (Federal Constitution); 
Maryland Community Developers, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n 261 Md. 205, 274 
A.2d 641 (1971), app. dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971) (Maryland Constitution). 
9l. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
92. 59 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 468 (1974). Of course an opinion of the Attorney General is 
not binding on the courts, but has persuasive effect. State ex rel. Adams v. 
Cadwalader, 227 Md. 21, 174 A.2d 786 (1961). 
93. Cf. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.s. 404 (1972) (unanimity not required by the sixth 
and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution in state criminal cases, 
and dictum that unanimity required by the sixth amendment in federal criminal 
cases); State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977) (jury unanimity 
guaranteed by Maryland Constitution may be waived by criminal defendant); 
MD. DECL. OF RIGH'I'S art. 21 ("That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath 
a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous 
consent he ought not to be found guilty"). 
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(c.) Judicial Supervisory Techniques. A variety of means by 
which the judge controls the jury have been upheld under both the 
federal and state constitutions, e.g., summary judgment,94 directed 
verdict,95 remittitur, 96 and new trial.97 The Maryland appellate 
courts use Supreme Court precedents as persuasive authority on 
these matters.98 
(d.) Reexamination. Although the Constitution of Maryland 
includes no Reexamination Clause,99 prohibiting another court's 
reexamination of facts tried by a jury (except according to the rules 
of common law), such a clause has been implied. loo 
11. Slavery and Involuntary Servitude. The federal 10 1 and 
statel02 prohibitions of slavery are similar. 103 The Maryland 
constitution, unlike the federal,104 no longer contains a provision 
prohibiting involuntary servitude.105 
94. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944) (federal); Fletcher 
v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 232 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952) 
(state). 
95. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (federal); Frush v. Brooks, 204 
Md. 315, 104 A.2d 624 (1954) (state). 
96. See Treat Mfg. Co. v. Standard Steel & Iron Co., 157 U.S. 674 (1895) (federal); 
Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 
(1960) (state). But cf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (additur invalidated 
under the Federal Constitution); Millison v. Clarke, 32 Md. App. 140, 359 A.2d 
127 (1976) (remedy of additur not yet recognized in Maryland). 
97. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (federal); Conklin v. 
Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969) (state). 
98. See id.; Millison v. Clarke, 32 Md. App. 140, 359 A.2d 127 (1976). 
99. Compare MD. CONST. art. XV, §6 (note 84 supra) with U.S. CONST. amend. VII 
(note 83 supra). 
100. Bd. of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A. 207 (1915). 
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction." 
102. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 provides in pertinent part: "That Slavery 
shall not be re-established in this State." Only one reported Maryland case 
construes article 24. In Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503 (1865), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals upheld a Negro apprentice law, compelling apprenticeships for certain 
minor Negroes having indigent parents, against an attack under article 24 in its 
1864 form. (See note 105 infra). The court held that an apprenticeship was 
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude within the meaning of that provision. 
Brown has been criticized. See A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 49 
(1915). 
103. See Id. at 13. 
104. See notes 101 and 102 supra. 
105. Cf. MD. CONST. OF 1864, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 states: "Hereafter, in this State, 
there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment of 
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and all persons held to 
service or labor as slaves, are hereby declared free." 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 38, set forth in note 181 infra, has been described as an 
anti-peonage provision. Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 301 A.2d 26 (1973), 
cert. denied, 268 Md. 754 (1973). 
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The right of persons, regardless of race, to be witnesses is only 
impliedly protected by the federal constitution,106 but is expressly 
protected by the state constitution.107 
12. Citizenship. The federal constitutional provision that 
defines citizenship in the United States and in the states lO8 has no 
counterpart in the state constitution. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals has held that state citizenship, where no question of federal 
rights or jurisdiction is involved, is generally synonymous with 
domicile, that is, permanent residence within the state. 109 
13. Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States. 
The federal constitutional provision prohibiting state abridgement of 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,110 has no 
counterpart in the state constitution. 
14. Due Process. The federal and state constitutions include 
guarantees of (a) substantive due process and (b) procedural due 
process. The provisions of federal and state constitutions are similar, 
except that the Maryland Constitution grants certain procedural 
rights not protected by the United States Constitution. 
106. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963), rev'd per curiam, 
376 U.S. 650 (1964). 
107. MD. CONST. art. III, § 53 provides "No person shall be incompetent, as a witness, 
on account of race or color, unless hereafter so declared by Act of the General 
Assembly." 
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside." 
109. In Crosse v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 243 Md. 555, 221 A.2d 431 (1966), 
the court of appeals held that a candidate for county sheriff, by his residence, 
became a citizen of the state, for purposes of the requirements of the state 
constitution, before he became a citizen of the United States. The court noted, 
however, that the requirements for state citizenship "depend not upon definition 
but the constitutional or statutory context in which the term is used." Id. at 559. 
In Sec'y of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966), the court of 
appeals held that state citizenship is not synonymous with residence for 
. purposes of determining the constitutional qualifications for governor. The 
definitions of "residence" and "domicile" are more thoroughly explored in 
Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 325 A.2d 392 (1974). 
Regarding the question of whether the children of resident non-immigrant 
aliens are domiciled in Maryland for purposes of tuition at a state university, see 
Moreno v. Univ. of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd without 
published opinion, 556 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nom. Elkins v. 
Moreno, 46 U.S.L.W. 3239 (1977). 
no. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States." This clause has been held to be a dead letter. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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(a) Substantive Due Process. The federal 11 1 and the state1l2 
constitutional provisions have been equated.113 In reviewing legisla-
tion not violative of some other constitutional provision, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals has held that due process, federal or 
state, requires only that the legislation have a rational basis.114 
111. U.S. CaNST. amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty 
mr property, qithout due process of law." U.S. CaNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: 
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." 
112. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 provides: 
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, 
ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to 
have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land. 
MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 20 states: "That the trial of facts, where 
they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the 
People." 
MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 23 provides: "That no man ought to be 
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or 
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or 
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." 
Articles 19, 23, 24, and 32 of the Declaration of Rights have been 
characterized as comprising due process. Report of the Constitutional Conven-
tion Commission 103 (1967). Article 24 is set forth at note 105 supra, and article 
32 provides: "That no person except regular soldiers, marines, and mariners in 
the service of this State, or militia, when in actual service, ought, in any case, to 
be subject to, or punishable by Martial Law." Like the fifth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, article 32 prohibits the military trial of a 
civilian. Constitutional Revision Study Documents 297-300 (1968). 
113. Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 
1968); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977). 
See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 39-41, 46-49,51-52 
(1915). 
114. The Maryland Court of Appeals has indicated some uncertainty in describing the 
due process test: 
The test for constitutionality under the Due Process Clause is whether a 
statute, as an exercise of the state's police power, bears a real and 
substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, and welfare of 
the citizens of this state. The exercise by the Legislature of the police 
power will not be interfered with unless it is shown to be exercised 
arbitrarily, oppressively or unreasonably. The wisdom or expediency of a 
law adopted in the exercise of the police power of a state is not subject to 
judicial review, and the law will not be held void if there are any 
considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be 
supported. Such a statute carries with it a strong presumption of 
constitutionality. 
Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975) 
(citations omitted). The uncertainty was in deciding whether the "real and 
substantial" relation formulation imposed a more stringent standard than that 
suggested by the other aspects of the test, or than that suggested by the Supreme 
Court in North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 
U.S. 156 (1973) (reasonableness test), overruling Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 
U.S. 105 (1928) ("real and substantial relation" test). The uncertainty has 
apparently been resolved by ignoring the "real and substantial relation" 
formulation in favor of a "reasonableness" test. See Governor of Maryland v. 
Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977). 
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The substanti~e due process interests - life, liberty, and 
property 1l5 - are subject to reasonable governmental regulation 
under both the federaP 16 and state1l7 constitutions. 
(b) Procedural Due Process. As noted above,1l8 the due process 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions have been equated. 
Both limit the power of courts to hear cases involving persons 
outside the jurisdiction,ll9 both require that notice and opportunity 
to be heard be given when government deprives any person of life, 
liberty, or property,120 and both prohibit certain irrebuttable pre-
sumptions.121 
In addition, the Maryland Constitution expressly protects 
certain procedural rights, including the right to local venue122 and 
the right of a party to automatic removal or change of venue upon 
certification by the party that a fair and impartial trial in the court 
in which the case was initiated is impossible.123 
115. Regarding the definition of these interests, see note 21 and accompanying text 
supra. 
116. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
117. See, e.g., Aero Motors, Inc. v. Adm'r, Motor Vehicle Administration, 274 Md. 567, 
337 A.2d 685 (1975). 
118. See note 113 and accompanying text supra. 
119. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (federal); Compania de Astral, S.A. v. 
Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 
(1955) (state). 
120. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (federal); Barry 
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros, Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976) (state). 
Barry, the latest significant decision regarding procedural due process require-
ments under the Maryland Constitution, follows the analysis of Sniadach and 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and holds that once a government 
deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest has been shown, the presumptive 
right to prior notice and hearing may be overcome only by a showing of 
"extraordinary circumstances." Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co.; 
277 Md. 15, 30, 353 A.2d 222, 231 (1976). The current federal approach, however, 
suggests that no presumptive right to prior notice and hearing exists and that 
the requirements of due process are determined by weighing the individual 
private and governmental interests in each case. Riger v. L & B Ltd. Partnership, 
278 Md. 281, 363 A.2d 481 (1976), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
121. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (federal); Mahoney v. Byers, 187 
Md. 81, 48 A.2d 600 (1946) (state). While the state rule apparently adopts a per se 
prohibition of irrebuttable presumptions, the federal rule is harder to character-
ize. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the due 
process clause forbids a presumption that "is not necessarily or universally true 
in fact ... when the State has reasonable alternative' means of making the 
crucial determination." Id. at 452. 
122. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 20 (quoted at note 112 supra). See Firstman v. 
Atlantic Constr. & Supply Co., 28 Md. App. 285, 345 A.2d 118 (1975); cf. Stewart 
v. State, 21 Md. App. 346, 319 A.2d 621 (1974), aff'd, 275 Md. 258, 340 A.2d 290 
(1975) (no constitutional right to trial in vicinity of act in criminal cases). 
123. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 8 provides: 
[I]n all suits or actions at law, issues from the orphans' court, or 
from any court sitting in equity, and in all cases of presentments or 
indictments for offenses, which are or may be punishable by death, 
pending in any of the courts of law in this State, having jurisdiction 
thereof, upon suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties to 
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Aside from these constitutional provisions, venue is the subject 
of somewhat similar state and federal laws. State statutes deal with 
the laying of venue124 and with stay or dismissal under the forum 
non conveniens doctrine.125 State court rules provide for transfer to 
another court within the same county, 126 for procedure after 
transfer127 and detail the consequences of improper venue.128 Federal 
statutes deal with the laying129 and changel30 of venue, and the 
consequences of improper venue.131 Federal decisional law autho-
rizes dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.132 
15. Equal Protection. The equal protection provisions of the 
federaP33 and state134 constitutions each offer more protection in 
certain respects than the other. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently assumed, without 
deciding, that the state due process clause includes an equal 
said proceedings, that such party cannot have a fair and impartial trial 
in the court in which the same may be pending, the said court shall order 
and direct the record of proceedings in such suit or action, issue, 
presentment or indictment, to be transmitted to some other court having 
jurisdiction in such case for trial; but in all other cases of presentment or 
indictment pending in any of the courts of law in this State, having 
jurisdiction thereof, in addition to the suggestion in writing of either of 
the parties to such presentment or indictment, that such party cannot 
have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the same may be 
pending, it shall be necessary for the party making such suggestion to 
make it satisfactorily appear to the court that such suggestion is true, or 
that there is reasonable ground for the same; and thereupon the said 
court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in such 
presentment or indictment to be transmitted to some other court, having 
jurisdiction in such cases, for trial; and such right of removal shall exist 
upon suggestion in cases when all the judges of said court may be 
disqualified under the provisions of this Constitution to sit in any such 
case; and said court to which the record of proceedings in such suit or 
action, issue, presentment or indictment may be so transmitted, shall 
hear and determine the same in like manner as if such suit or action, 
issue, presentment or indictment had been originally instituted therein; 
and the General Assembly shall make such modification of existing law 
as may be necessary to regulate and give force to this provision. 
Notwithstanding the reference to removal of issues "from any court .sitting in 
equity," the right of removal is not available in equity cases. Olson v. Lo"ve, 234 
Md. 503, 200 A.2d 66 (1964). Article IV, § 8· has been declared unenforceable, 
perhaps temporarily, by litigants in civil cases, because it violates the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 
366 A.2d 21 (1976). 
124. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 6-201 to 4203 (Cum. Supp. 1977). 
125. ld. § 6-104. 
126. MD. RULE 515. 
127. MD. RULE 542. 
128. MD. RULE 317. 
129. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1407 (1970). 
130. ld. §§ 1404, 1406. 
131. ld. § 1406. 
132. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any State ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." 
134. See notes 135 to 138 and accompanying text infra. 
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protection element.135 In view of the Maryland precedents136 and the 
meaning of the concept of due process,137 it is likely that the court 
will decide that equal protection is indeed implied in due process.138 
135. See Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410,370 A.2d 1102 (1977). In 
Exxon Corp. the court noted: 
The Maryland Constitution does not contain an express equal protection 
clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment [to the Constitution of the 
United States]. The trial court's equal protection holding was apparently 
premised upon the Due Process Clause of [article 23 of] the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. For the purposes of appeal, we shall assume that 
the Due Process Clause, Art. 23, embodies the concept of equal 
protection. We shall further assume that the standard of review under 
both the Maryland Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the same where economic regulation is 
challenged on equal protection grounds. 
Id. at 438, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 n.8 (citations omitted). 
136. See United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 173 A. 903 (1934), 
rev'd on. other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1934). After noting that the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment invalidates state statutes which unreasona· 
bly or arbitrarily discriminate between persons or classes, the court in Matthews 
states: "Those portions of the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights 
(Articles 19, 23, and 44) relied on afford protection to its citizens against 
unreasonable or arbitrary discrimination in like manner and to the same extent 
as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 395, 173 A.2d 
903, 909. Discriminatory classifications were invalidated on the authority of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and article 23 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights in Bruce v. Dir., Chesapeake Bay Aff., 261 Md. 
585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971); Mayor of Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 259 
Md. 595, 271 A.2d 144 (1970); Maryland Coal 9 realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 
Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949); Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936). A 
discriminatory classification was held unconstitutional under authority of article 
23 alone in Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951). 
137. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the fifth 
amendment due process clause, which applies in the event of federal governmen-
tal action, implicitly includes an equal protection element. 
138. This conclusion may be reached by either of two approaches: (a) by arguing that 
two things are equal to a third are equal to each other, or (b) by arguing that the 
concept of due process, wherever it appears in our federal or state constitutions, 
is a single idea. 
The due process clause of article 23 of the Maryland Constitution is like the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See note 113 and accompanying 
text supra. The due process clause of the fifth amendment is like the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal 
& Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974), implying in the fourteenth 
amendment a just compensation provision, and Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873), equating the due process clause of the fifth amendment, as it 
applies against federal governmental action, with the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, as it applies against state governmental action. 
Therefore, the due process clause of article 23 is like the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment and, since the fifth amendment includes an implicit equal 
protection element, so does article 23. See Maryland Comm. for Fair Representa-
tion v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 423, 184 A.2d 715, 724 (1962) (Brune, C.J., dissenting). 
As to the concept of due process, wherever it appears, being a single idea, see 
Slaughter·House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
The constitution of at least one other state has been held to include, 
implicitly, an equal protection provision. In re Christoph, 205 Wis. 418,237 N.W. 
134 (1931) (holding that equal protection is implicit in the rights of "life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness."). 
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With respect to the test to be applied in equal protection cases, 
the Maryland precedents suggest an "any rational basis" test.139 If 
the equal protection element of the state due process clause is to be 
controlled by precedents under the federal equal protection clause, 1 40 
however, the court of appeals will adopt the "two tier" analysis; 
under this analysis a "strict scrutiny" test, requiring government to 
show a "compelling interest," is applied when governmental action 
discriminates on the basis of "suspect classifications" or interferes 
with "fundamental rights" and an "any rational basis" test is 
applied in other situations. 
In addition to the general guarantee of equal protection, both 
federal and state constitutions include certain specific guarantees of 
equal protection. The federal interstate privileges and immunities 
clause, which has no state counterpart, has been discussed above. l4l 
Both federa1I 42 and state143 constitutions generally guarantee an 
equal right to vote. Both constitutions also expressly prohibit poll 
taxes. 144 The federal, but not the state, constitution expressly 
guarantees the equal right to vote free of discrimination on the basis 
of race,145 sex146 and age (if 18 years or 0Ider}.147 
On the other hand, the state constitution, but not the federal, 
includes express, specific guarantees of equal protection against 
139. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 135-36 supra. 
140. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
141. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
142. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2, d. 1 (quoted at note 158 infra). 
143. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 4 provides: "Each legislative district shall consist of 
adjoining territory, be compact in form, and of substantially equal population. 
Due regard shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political 
subdivisions." . 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 5 provides: 
Upon petition of any registered voter, the Court of Appeals shall have 
original jurisdiction to review the legislative districting of the State and 
may grant appropriate relief, if it finds that the districting of the State is 
not consistent with cequirements of either the Constitution of the United 
States of America, or the Constitution of Maryland. 
144. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXIV, § 1 provides: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other 
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice 
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason offailure 
to pay any poll tax or other tax. 
MD. CaNST., DECL. aF RIGHTS art. 15 provides: "The levying of taxes by the 
poll is grievous and oppressive and ought to be prohibited." 
145. U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State or 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 
146. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIX, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex." 
147. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXVI, § 1 states: "The right of citizens of the United States, 
who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of age. 
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discrimination in taxation 148 and on the basis of sex.149 The only 
federal guarantee of equal protection in those areas is the equal 
protection clause. l50 Regarding taxation, the express state provision 
and the federal equal protection clause are comparable; both 
apparently prohibit only unreasonable discrimination.15l With 
respect to sexual classifications, however, the express state provision 
requires strict equality between the sexes,152 while the federal equal 
protection clause requires something less. I53 
The express state constitutional prohibition of monopolies,154 
which has no federal counterpart, may also be considered a specific 
guarantee of equal protection against certain economic discrimina-
tion.155 Likewise, the express state constitutional prohibitions of 
148. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 15 provides: 
[T]he General Assembly shall, by uniform rules, provide for the separate 
assessment, cfassification and sub-classification of land, improvements 
on land and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes 
thereafter provided to be levied by the State for the support of the 
general State Government, and by the Counties and by the City of 
Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform within each 
class or sub-class of land, improvements on land and personal property 
which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to 
the tax levy; yet [mes, duties or taxes may properly and justly be 
imposed, or laid with a political view for the good government and 
benefit of the community. 
See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 24-36 (1915). 
Uniformity of assessments, as well as of tax rates, is required. State Tax 
Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d 676 (1959). Implicit in the uniformity 
rule is a requirement that the tax be ad valorem, or according to "actual worth." 
Weaver v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 349, 379 A.2d 399 (1977). The 
uniformity requirement does not apply to income taxes, Marco Assocs. v. 
Comptroller of Treasury, 265 Md. 669, 291 A.2d 489 (1972), to excise taxes, 
Weaver v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 349, 379 A.2d 399 (1977), nor to taxes 
laid with a "political view," e.g., taxes upon occupations, privileges and 
contracts, Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A.2d 763 (1940). But cf. U.s. CaNST. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 3 & §9, cl. 4 (requiring apportionment of direct taxes). 
149. MD. CONST.,DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 provides: "Equality of rights under the law 
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." 
150. See note 133 supra. 
151. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (federal); Shell Oil 
Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 278 Md. 659, 366 A.2d 369 (1976) (state). 
152. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). 
153. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
154. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 41 (quoted at note 179 infra). 
155. Raney v. County Comm'rs, 170 Md. 183, 183 A. 548 (1936). 
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local and special legislation,156 which have no federal counter-
parts,157 may be considered specific guarantees of equal protection. 
16. Vote. The protection for the right to vote offered by the state 
constitution appears broader than that offered by the federal 
constitution. The Constitution of the United States provides that 
members of the House of Representatives158 and the Senate159 shall 
be chosen or elected "by the people," and thus guarantees the right 
to vote in the election of federallegislators. l60 The federal constitu-
tion also guarantees the right to vote in presidential elections.161 No 
right to vote in the election of state and local officials is expressly 
guaranteed by the federal constitution. 162 Once the franchise is 
granted, however, the equal right to vote in such elections is 
protected by a number of provisions.163 
156. MD. CaNsT. art. III, § 33 provides: 
The General Assembly shall not pass local, or special Laws, in any 
of the following enumerated cases, viz.: For extending the time for the 
collection of taxes; granting divorces; changing the name of any person; 
providing for the sale of real estate, belonging to minors, or other 
persons laboring under legal disabilities, by executors, administrators, 
guardians or trustees; giving effect to informal, or invalid deeds or wills; 
refunding money paid into the State Treasury, or releasing persons from 
their debts, or obligations to the State, unless recommended by the 
Governor, or officers of the Treasury Department. And the General 
Assembly shall pass no special Law, for any case, for which provision 
has been made, by an existing General Law. The General Assembly, at 
its first Session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall pass 
General Laws, providing for the cases enumerated in this section, which 
are not already adequately provided for, and for all other cases, where a 
General Law can be made applicable. 
157. But cf. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6: "No Preference shall be given by any 
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, 
or pay Duties in another." 
158. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States." 
159. U.S. CaNST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 states: "The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof." 
160. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
161. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXIV, § 1 provides ih part: "The right of citizens of the 
United States to vote in any ... election for President ... shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll 
tax or other tax." See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
162. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (citizens have a right to vote in 
state elections) with Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) 
(leaving open the question of whether citizens have a right to vote in state 
elections, but deciding that once the franchise is granted, they have an equal 
right to vote). But see U.S. CaNST. amends. XV, XIX, and XXVI, quoted at notes 
145-47 supra, which prohibit states from denying the right to vote on account of 
race, sex, or age. 
163. U.S. CaNST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI (quoted at notes 133,145,146, 
144, and 147, respectively, supra). See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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By contrast the Constitution of Maryland provides a right to 
vote "at all elections ... held in this State."164 Contrary to several 
early decisions holding that the right to vote was not an absolute, 
unqualified, personal right,165 the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
more recently held that a person with the requisite constitutional 
qualifications has the absolute right to vote.166 
17. Travel. By implication the federal constitution,167 but not 
the state, guarantees the right to travel. There is, however, a state 
statute acknowledging a right of air travel.168 Of course, to the extent 
that the right to travel is based on the due process clauses of the fifth 
or fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution, a right to 
travel may be implied in the due process provisions of the state 
constitution, which provisions have received a similar construc-
tion.169 
18. Privacy. By implication the federal constitution,170 but not 
the state,171 guarantees the right of privacy. Of course, to the extent 
164. MD. CaNST. art. I, § 1 provides: 
[E]very citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one year's, or 
upwards, who has been a resident of the State for six months, and Of the 
Legislative District of Baltimore city, or of the county, in which he may 
offer to vote, as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding 
the election, shall be entitled to vote, in the ward or election district, in 
which he resides, at all elections hereafter to be held in this State. 
MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 7 states: 
That the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the best 
security of liberty and the foundation of all free Government; for this 
purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen having 
the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right 
of suffrage. 
See A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36-37, 86-93 (1915). 
165. See Carter v. Applegarth, 102 Md. 336, 62 A. 710 (1905); Anderson v. Baker, 23 
Md, 531 (1865). . 
166. See Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937); Smith v. Hackett, 129 Md. 
73, 98 A. 140 (1916); Langhammer v. Munter, 80 Md. 518, 31 A. 300 (1895); Kemp 
v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 24 A. 606 (1892); cf. 56 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 189 (1971) 
(students and citizens 18 to 20 years old must be considered emancipated for 
voting purposes and the same standards must be used to determine their voting 
residences as are used for other citizens under the twenty-sixth amendment and 
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution). 
167. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1974) (implied in the interstate 
privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution); Kent v. Dulles, 357 
U.S. 116 (1958) (implied in the fifth amendment due process clause of the Federal 
Constitution); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (implied in the 
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 
Wall.) 35 (1868) (right to travel related to the right of petition under the first 
amendment, and correlative to federal governmental powers). 
168. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-1001 (1977) provides: "There is a public right to 
freedom of transit in air commerce through the airspace of this State." 
169. See notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra. 
170. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy is within 
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause). 
171. Cf. Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), app. 
dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1975) (finding no unconstitutional invasion of privacy in 
financial disclosure laws under the Federal Constitution without considering the 
effect of the Maryland Constitution); In re Trader. 272 Md. 364. 325 A.2d 398 
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that the right of privacy is based on the due process clauses of the 
fifth or fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution, a right of 
privacy may be implied in the due process provisions of the state 
constitution, which provisions have received a similar construc-
tion.l72 
19. Other Rights. Both the federaP 73 and the stateI74 constitu-
tions affirm in similar terms the existence of other rights not 
expressly enumerated.175 While the federal provision has spawned 
certain substantive rights, such as the right to privacy,176 the state 
provision lies dormant. 
The Constitution of Maryland expressly protects certain other 
substantive rights, which are not protected by the Constitution of 
the United States, including the right of revolution,177 the right of 
(1974) (Maryland statute that declared an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction to 
be interlocutory did not violate the" federal constitutional right of privacy); 
Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 
(1972) (considering the constitutionality of a perverted sex practice statute under 
the Federal Constitution). 
In Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 302 A.2d 682 (1973), however, the 
court stated: "We conclude that the law of Maryland is that the father of 
illegitimate children may not be denied the right to seek custody of those 
children." Marshall cited Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which, relying 
in part on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), impliedly recognized the 
right to privacy. 
172. See notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra. 
173. U.S. CaNST. amend. IX provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people." 
President Jimmy Carter has stated that a basic human right, defined in the 
Declaration of Independence, is the pursuit of happiness, which includes "the 
right to a basic standard of material existence - to food, shelter, health care, 
and education." Baltimore Sun, Sept. 19, 1977, at A 11, cols. 3-5. 
174. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 45 provides: "This enumeration of Rights shall 
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the People." 
175. A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 64-65 (1915). 
176. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
177. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1 provides: "That all Government of rights 
originates from the People, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for 
the good of the whole; and they have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter, 
reform or abolish their Form of Government in such manner as they may deem 
expedient." MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 6 provides: 
[Wlhenever the ends of Government are perverted, and public liberty 
manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, 
the People may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new 
Government; the doctrine of non·resistance against arbitrary power and 
oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness 
of mankind. 
According to commentary, these provisions guarantee a right of revolution. 
Constitutional Revision Study Documents 13 (1968); Report ofthe Constitutional 
Convention Commission 100 (1967). See Debates of the Maryland Constitutional 
Convention of 1867 98-99 (1923), where proposed amendments to article 1 were 
defeated. The amendments would have limited the exercise of the right to the use 
of those means prescribed by law or by the constitution. Opponents of the 
amendments argued, among other things, that the right was inalienable and, 
therefore, could not be limited. But cf. MD. CaNST. OF 1851, DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 
1, which included such a limitation. Compare Bd. of Supervisors of Elections v. 
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paupers not to be taxed for the support of the government,178 the 
right to be free of monopolies,179 the right to free public education,lBO 
the right to be free of imprisonment for debt,181 the right of a wife to 
Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967) (people retain power to 
rewrite their constitution) with Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 
473 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956) (no right to rebellion where the 
existing government provides for peaceful and orderly change). 
Although no similar provision appears in the Constitution of the United 
States, The Declaration of Independence provides: 
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends [securing the unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to 
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to 
effect their Safety and Happiness. 
178. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 15 provides: "[P]aupers ought not to be 
assessed for the support of the government." This provision may be violated by 
the sales tax. Lewis, The Tax Articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 13 
MD. L. REV. 83, 92 (1953). 
179. MD. CaNST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 41 provides: "That monopolies are odious, 
contrary to the spirit of a free government and the principles of commerce, a'nd 
ought not to be suffered." See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 62-63 (1915). The question of whether article 41 prohibits all monopolies, or 
only those granted by the state, was expressly reserved in Grempler v. Multiple 
Listing Bureau, 258 Md. 419, 266 A.2d 1 (1970), comparing Wright v. State, 88 
Md. 436, 41 A. 795 (1898) (a monopoly must be granted by the state) with Levin v. 
Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174,46 .2d 298 (1946) (implicitly assuming that the practices 
of a private corporation might constitute a monopoly). The prohibition of article 
41 excludes monopolies reasonably required for the protection of the public 
interest and those given in return for a public service or given in reference to a 
matter not of common right. Id. at 183, 46 A.2d 298, 302. 
Monopolies are prohibited by both federal statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1970), 
and state statute, MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 11-201 to -213 (1975). 
180. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 43 provides: "That the Legislature ought to 
encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious 
system of general education, the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, 
agriculture, commerCe and manufactures, and the general amelioration of the 
condition of the People." See generally A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 63 (1915). MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 provides: "The General Assembly, at its 
First Session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish 
throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and 
shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance." The latter 
provision has been said in dictum to grant a right to a public school education. 
State ex rei. Clark v. Maryland Institute, 87 Md. 643, 41 A. 126 (1898). 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 1, 40, 73, respectively, provide in pertinent part as 
follows: 
There shall be throughout the State of Maryland a general system of free 
public schools. 
The county boards of education are authorized, empowered, directed, and 
required to maintain throughout their respective political subdivisions a 
reasonably uniform system of public schools designed to provide quality 
education and equal educational opportunity for all youth. 
All persons between the ages of five and twenty years shall be admitted 
free of charge to the public schools of the State. 
The right to a free public education in Maryland has been held to be a 
statutory right. Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland, Equity No. 
77676 (Bait. Co. Cir. Ct., Apr. 9, 1974). 
181. MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 provides: 
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for 
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have property free from her husband's debts,182 the right to have a 
reasonable amount of property free from execution,183 the right to be 
free from usurious interest rates184 and the power of the referen-
dUm.185 Commentary has also suggested the guarantee of an 
opportunity for economic well-being.186 
the support of a wife or dependent children, or for the support of an 
illegitimate child or children, or for alimony, shall not constitute a debt 
within the meaning of this section. 
Federal. law offers some protection against imprisonment for debt. The equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits imprisonment of 
indigents for failure to pay fines arising from convictions for traffic offenses, 
where no imprisonment is imposed on those who pay the fines. Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395 (1971). A federal statute prohibits federal courts from imprisoning 
persons for debts in states which prohibit the same. 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (1970). In 
addition to the express exceptions to the term "debt" in article III, § 38, the 
following are not "debts," i.e., a person may not be imprisoned for failure to pay 
the obligation: fine of a court upon conviction for a crime, Ruggles v. State, 120 
Md. 553, 87 A. 817 (1887), and statutory obligation of a tax collector to pay taxes 
collected by him to the state treasury, State v. Nicholson, 67 Md. 1, 8 A. 817 
(1887). 
182. MD. CONST. art. III, § 43 provides: "The property of the wife shall be protected 
from the debts of her husband." Article III, § 43 precludes recovery from a wife of 
the cost of maintenance and care of her husband in a state mental hospital, 
where the husband was involuntarily committed by a criminal court judge for 
the protection of the public. Rowe v. Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 247 Md. 542, 233 
A.2d 769 (1967) (invalidating, as applied, a statute that made a wife liable for the 
support of her husband in such a case). 
183. MD. CONST. art. III, § 44 provides: "Laws shall be passed by the General 
Assembly, to protect from execution a reasonable amount of the property of the 
debtor. A reasonable amount of cemetery property, obtained to accommodate the 
debtor and his family and not for speculative purposes, is not "property of the 
debtor," within the meaning of article III, § 44, which can be executed against. 
Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 209 A.2d 914 (1965). 
The statutory exemptions from execution are set forth in MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-504 to -507 (1974). 
184. MD. CONST. art. III, § 57 provides: "The Legal Rate of Interest shall be Six per 
cent. per annum; unless otherwise provided by the General Assembly." 
This provision has been held not to invalidate a usurious contract in whole 
or in part, a task that is left to the legislature. Scott v. Leary, 34 Md. 389 (1871). 
State statutory provisions regarding usury are set forth in MD. COM. LAw 
CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -114 (1975). 
Statutory exception of corporations from the protection of usury laws does 
not violate equal protection. Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 
131 A. 332 (1925). 
185. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § l(a) provides: 
The people reserve to themselves power known as The Referendum, by 
petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the State, to 
approve or reject at the polls, an Act, or part of any Act of the General 
Assembly, if approved by the Governor, or, if passed by the General 
Assembly over the veto of the Governor. 
186. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 43 provides: "That the Legislature ought to 
encourage ... the general melioration of the condition of the People." 
The Committee on Personal Rights and the Preamble of the Maryland 
Constitutional Convention of 1967 proposed a constitutional provision, based on 
article 43, which stated the legal policy of the state for all persons to have 
economic security, the opportunity for employment and the means to provide a 
decent standard of living. 1 Maryland Constitutional Convention, 1967-68 
Publications, Committee Recommendation No. R&P-2 (Nov. 17, 1967) and 
Committee Memorandum No. R&P-1 (Nov. 15. 1967). 
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B. ((State Action" 
Most rights under the federal constitution are guaranteed only 
against infringement by federal and/or state governments, not 
against infringement by private individuals. ls7 However, certain 
rights, including the right to travel and the rights to be free of 
slavery and involuntary servitude, are guaranteed against infringe-
ment by private persons as well as by federal and state govern-
ments.lSS 
Whether the state constitution guarantees rights only against 
infringement by the state government, or also by private individu-
als, has not received extensive comment.lS9 Certain constitutional 
rights by their nature or language suggest a "state action" 
requirement. Provisions prohibiting a religious test as a qualifica-
tion for office,l90 protecting religious freedom,19l permitting the right 
to petition the legislature,192 securing just compensation where 
property is taken by eminent domain,193 preserving the right of trial 
by jury,194 guaranteeing the rights to vote,195 recognizing the right of 
revolution,196 freeing paupers from assessment of taxes,197 establish-
187. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 898 (9th ed. 1975). 
"State action" also exists, of course, in those cases in which government is 
"significantly involved in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369 (1967). 
188. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Other rights guaranteed against 
private individuals are set forth in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771 
(1966) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
189. The following portion of commentary on a proposed due process clause for a 
Maryland constitution addresses the issue: 
[T]he Commission's position [is] that the function of a Declaration of 
Rights is to state those personal rights which the people want protected 
from the exercise of the powers of government and that a constitution or 
Declaration of Rights should not be used as the means for protecting the 
rights of private persons against the actions of other private persons. 
Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission 104 (1967). 
MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1 (quoted at note 177 supra), however, 
recognizes the basis of rightful government as a compact among the people. That 
is, there are constitutional rights because the people agree that there are, not 
because they have gained concessions from the sovereign, as the English barons 
extracted the Magna Carta from King John in 1215. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 
(Hamilton). 
One commentator has recommended, generally, that at least some provisions 
of state bills of rights should be made applicable against private, as well as 
governmental, conduct. Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 473-74 (1970). 
190. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 37 (quoted at note 39 supra). 
191. Id. art. 36 (quoted at note 44 supra). 
192. Id. art. 13 (quoted at note 61 supra); cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 
(1875) (dictum: private interference with right to petition may be punished). 
193. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 40 (quoted at note 75 supra). 
194. Id. art. XV, § 6 (quoted at note 84 supra). 
195. Id. art. 1, ~ 1; art. III, ~~ 4-5; DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 7, 15 (quoted at notes 164, 143, 
164, and 144, respectively, supra); cf. Ex parte Yarborough, llO U.S. 651 (1884) 
(private interference with right to vote may be punished). 
196. MD. CaNST., DECL. OF RIGHTS arts. 1, 6 (quoted at note 177 supra). 
197. Id. art. 15 (quoted at note 178 supra). 
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ing a system of free public schools,198 prohibiting imprisonment for 
debt,199 protecting a wife's property from her husband's debts,200 
protecting a reasonable amount of a debtor's property from 
execution,201 reserving to the people the power of the referendum202 
and guaranteeing an opportunity for economic well-being203 all 
apparently require some degree of state action. 
Judicial constructions of other constitutional rights have 
suggested a "state action" requirement with respect to provisions 
preserving freedom of press and speech204 and guaranteeing due 
process.205 
The language of certain other constitutional rights, however, 
suggests no "state action" requirement. Examples include the 
provisions abolishing slavery206 and establishing a legal rate of 
interest.207 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has expressly reserved the 
question of whether there is a "state action" requirement in the 
provision prohibiting monopolies:208 
Once it is clear that "state action" is required by certain 
provisions of the state constitution, the question becomes, what 
amount of state participation constitutes "state action."209 The court 
of appeals apparently considers the "state action" requirements of 
the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions to be 
similar in nature.210 Even if federal law on the subject is followed, 
however, a determination of the degree of state action required rarely 
would be difficult. This is partly because of the "case-by-case" 
approach endorsed by the Supreme Court,2l1 because the "state 
action" requirement seems to have changed over time,212 because the 
amount of state action required depends upon whether the constitu-
198. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 43 (quoted at note 180 supra). 
199. MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (quoted at note 181 supra). 
200. [d. § 43 (quoted at note 182 supra). The "state action" might include the statute or 
court rule authorizing the attachment, the court ordering the attachment and/or 
the sheriff attaching the property. 
201. [d. § 44 (quoted at note 183 supra). 
202. [d. art. XVI, § l(a) (quoted at note 185 supra). 
203. [d. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 43 (quoted at note 186 supra). 
204. [d. art. 40 (quoted at note 56 supra); see Howard Sports Daily, Inc. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 179 Md. 355, 18 A.2d 210 (1941). 
205. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19, 20, 23 (quoted at note 112 supra); see Barry 
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15,353 A.2d 222 (1976); 55 Op. 
Md. Att'y Gen. 122, 161 (1970). 
206. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 24 (quoted at note 102 supra). 
207. MD. CONST. art. III, § 57 (quoted at note 184 supra). 
208. Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 258 Md. 419, 266 A.2d 1 (1970). 
209. Burton v. wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
210. Barry Properties, Inc. V. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976). 
211. Burton V. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
212. See Hudgen V. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), overruling Food Employees, Local 590 
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Compare Jackson V. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) with Public Utilities Comm'n v. 
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
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tional provision applies of its own force or is enforced by statute213 
and, perhaps, because the amount of "state action" required varies 
between different constitutional rights.214 
The state, by constitutional provision, statute, regulation, rule or 
order, may define what amount of "state action" is required. For 
example, the Governor's Code of Fair Practices215 prohibits state 
agencies and employees from discriminating on the basis of politics, 
religion, marital status, race, color, sex, creed, age and national 
origin. The Code also prohibits state agencies and employees from 
authorizing the use of state facilities in furtherance of discrimina-
tory practices or from authorizing their use by any group which 
discriminates on those bases. 
C. Remedies for Violation of Constitutional Rights 
Appropriate civil remedies for violation of constitutional rights 
have been implied in the federal constitution216 or have been enacted 
by statute.217 Such remedies are expressly suggested by the state 
constitution.218 
D. Conclusion 
Provisions for individual rights under the Constitution of 
Maryland, as we have seen, are largely similar in language and 
construction to provisions for individual rights under the Constitu-
tion of the United States. This conclusion seems less a result of the 
state's abdication of its role in our federal system as the primary 
repository of governmental powers and the primary protector of 
213. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring, and Brennan, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
214. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dis sen ting). 
215. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1976.05 (July 9, 1976); 9A MD. ANN. CODE 146 (Cum. Supp. 
1977). 
216. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
217. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
218. MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 19 (quoted at note 112 supra). A similar 
provision in the Connecticut Constitution is discussed in Note, Constitutionally 
Incorporated Common Law, 8 CONN. L. REV. 753 (1976). 
In Mciver v. Russell, 264 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1967), a case decided before 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the court stated: 
There does not appear to be any Maryland statute, comparable to the 
federal enforcement provision set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
implements private enforcement of the rights secured by Article 23 of the 
Declaration of Rights. Further, there appear to be no Maryland cases 
which have determined or even discussed whether the State constitu-
tional rights secured by Article 23, or by any other provision of the 
Declaration of Rights, may be enforced in a civil action for damages in 
the absence of such a statute. This is a matter which remains to this day 
unsettled as a general proposition of constitutional law. 
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individual rights219 than a result of the framers of both constitutions 
relying on a common constitutional law tradition.220 
The Constitution of Maryland, as we have seen, is more 
protective of certain individual rights than is the Constitution of the 
United States.221 The Constitution of Maryland may become even 
more protective of individual rights by (1) constitutional amend-
ment,222 (2) liberal legislative, judicial and administrative interpreta-
tion of the scope of individual rights,223 (3) minimizing any "state 
action" requirement224 and (4) free provision of remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights. 225 
219. U.S. CONST. amends. IX (quoted at note 173 supra) and X ("The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). See also 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. 
Madison); Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission 98 (1967). 
220. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 179-81, 983 (1971). 
221. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra. 
222. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 46 (quoted at note 149 supra). 
223. See note 215 and accompanying text supra. 
224. See part III B supra. 
225. See Part III C supra. 
